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Abstract
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995, ) have
shown that participants are strongly motivated by fairness and efficiency considerations.
This evidence, however, results mainly from experimental designs asking directly for shar-
ing monetary rewards. But even when not just one kind of monetary tokens is distributed
efficiency and fairness are less influential. We investigate and confirm this frame depen-
dency more systematically by comparing net-trade-proposals and payoff-proposals for the
same exchange economy with two traders, two commodities and multi-period-negotiations.
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1 Introduction
Experimental results for social interaction often question the Game-theoretic benchmark so-
lution (based on own material payoff maximization) whenever it predicts a very biased payoff
distribution (see Roth, 1995, for a survey of results). Already the early and surprisingly clearcut
results of Owen and Nydegger (1975) revealed a strong tendency
• to maximize total payoff and
• to share it rather equally if possible.1
Later findings revealed slightly more heterogeneity in behavior but confirmed that participants
strive for efficiency and equal monetary payoffs.
These robust findings from many experiments by many scholars may, however, be due to
an implicit framing or even demand effect: What participants can choose in most of those
experiments2 is either directly the distribution of monetary rewards, e.g. in the ultimatum
experiment (Gu¨th et al., 1982), or something sufficiently close to it, like chips, as in the Owen
and Nydegger (1975)-study. Already two types of tokens, that are linearly related to monetary
earnings, may, however, seriously question the efficiency and fairness of the results (Gu¨th et al.,
1982, and Gu¨th and Gneezy, 1997), especially if one does not know the monetary token values
of the other party (Kagel et al., 1992).
Our main hypothesis goes even further: Presenting an allocation problem as a monetary
reward allocation task suggests or even calls for considering efficiency and fairness.3 If, however,
what parties earn in monetary terms has to be calculated rather than chosen directly there will
be significantly less efficiency and fairness.
To test this experimentally we rely on a simple exchange economy with two traders and two
commodities, where allocations can be identified by the consumption vector of one trader in the
trade box, determined by total endowments (Edgeworth, 1881). In one treatment participants
bargain over net trades by indicating an allocation in the trade box. In the other treatment they
bargain in the corresponding payoff space like in usual bargaining games (e.g. Nash, 1950 and
1953). Thus, in one treatment they have to derive the monetary consequences of an allocation
(in the trade box) whereas in the second treatment they only have to check whether a given
payoff vector in payoff space is feasible.
In the following, section 2 we describe the set up of the exchange economy with its benchmark
solutions, both in allocation space as well as in payoff space. Details of the experimental design
are given in section 3. The experimental results are described and statistically analyzed in
section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The exchange economy
We assume the simplest exchange economy (see Hildenbrand and Kirman, 1988) with households
h ∈ H = {a, b} and two commodities 1 and 2, i. e. with consumption vectors xh = (xh,1, xh,2)
in IR2+. Total endowments are
E1 = ea,1 + eb,1 and E2 = ea,2 + eb,2 with E1, E2 > 0,
1In public-good experiments with the best-shot technology (the maximal contribution determines how much
of the public good is produced) this is not possible which results in low efficiency and unfair payoff distributions
(Prasnikar and Roth, 1992).
2More generally, most experiments instead of material consequences, from which such earnings can be derived,
directly assign monetary payoffs to strategy vectors or plays.
3What we mean here is not that the usual monetary payoff proposals should be framed as market decisions
but that choices are not payoff proposals.
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where eh,i denotes agent h’s endowment of commodity i. We assume ea,1 = E1 and eb,2 = E2
and thus ea,2 = 0 = eb,1.
Monetary payoff functions are assumed as
Ua(xa) = xαa,1 x
1−α
a,2 and Ub(xb) = x
β
b,1 x
1−β
b,2 with 0 < α, β < 1.
Allocations
X = (xa, xb) with xa, xb ∈ IR2+, and xa + xb = (E1, E2)
can be identified with the consumption vector xa in the trade box B (see Figure 1). All
allocations xa are individually rational4 in the sense that Uh(xh) ≥ 0 = Uh(eh) since we assume
eh 6= (0, 0) but eh,1 · eh,2 = 0 for both h ∈ H.
E2
E1 xa  , 1
xb  , 1
xb  , 2
xa  , 2
0
trade box B
Figure 1: THE TRADE BOX
The interior efficient allocations xa can be derived by maximizing
L(xa, λ) = xαa,1 x
1−α
a,2 − λ
[
Ub − (E1 − xa,1)β (E2 − xa,2)1−β
]
over xa ∈ B, λ ∈ IR for all constants Ub satisfying
0 < Ub < E
β
1 E
1−β
2 .
From ∂L(·)∂xa,1 = 0,
∂L(·)
∂xa,2
= 0 and ∂L(·)∂λ = 0 (the second order conditions follow from the
convexity of preferences) one obtains the conditions
α
1− α ·
xa,2
xa,1
=
β
1− β ·
E2 − xa,2
E1 − xa,1 (1)
and
Ub = (E1 − xa,1)β (E2 − xa,2)1−β . (2)
4Thus, both treatments, the one with the trade box and the one with the payoff space as action sets, identify
individual rationality with natural non-negativity constraints.
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Solving equation (1) for xa,2 yields
xa,2 =
β (1− α)E2 xa,1
α (1− β) (E1 − xa,1) + β (1− α)xa,1 . (3)
Inserting this into (2) leads to
Ub = (E1 − xa,1)β
(
E2 − β(1− α)E2xa,1
α(1− β)E1 − [α(1− β)− β(1− α)]xa,1
)1−β
(4)
which can be solved numerically, yielding a function xa,1(Ub). Finally, one computes xa,2(Ub)
via equation (3). Thus, we have derived how the (interior) efficient allocations xa(Ub) =
(xa,1(Ub), xa,2(Ub)) depend on household b’s payoff Ub. Whereas in allocation space B, the
set of efficient allocations is directly determined by the so-called contract curve (see Figure 2)
xa(Ub), in payoff space (see Figure 3) it is given by the utility frontier U+a (Ub) = Ua(xa(Ub)).
Note that point N in Figures 3 and 2 represents the Nash (1950 and 1953)-bargaining solution
in payoff space, resp. in the trade box.
E2
E1 xa  , 1
xa  , 2
0
N
U
Figure 2: THE CONTRACT CURVE
3 Experimental design
The computerized experiment was performed in the experimental laboratory at the University of
Karlsruhe. A session with 16 participants always relied on 2 matching groups with 8 participants
each. In each matching group players were randomly assigned to play the role of player a or
player b, which they kept throughout the whole experiment. We refer to the possible 5 rounds
of simultaneous trade proposals with the same partner as one period of trade.
After one period of trade players were rematched within matching groups. Participants in
total played 10 periods. To discourage repeated game effects as far as possible participants were
not informed that rematching is restricted to smaller matching groups.5
5Statistically, due to repeated measurement only matching groups qualify as independent observations.
3
ub
ua
u  u = constanta b
N
U
Figure 3: THE PARETO FRONTIER IN BARGAINING
In both treatments we ran five sessions, i.e. we collected data from 10 matching groups per
treatment. To simplify notation we consider the decision problems faced by the participants
from a neutral trader’s perspective (either a or b) in Figures 2, resp. 3. Thus, in
• treatment B (trade box) a participant selects her own consumption vector x by clicking
on a point in the visible trade box (Figure 1) on the computer screen with the mouse
which automatically generates the residual consumption vector xˆ via the relation xˆ =
(E1, E2)− x.
• In treatment P (payoff space) a participant selects her own payoff demand u and the
payoff level uˆ which she concedes to her opponent by clicking on the desired point in the
payoff space (Figure 3) visible on the computer screen.
In treatment B subjects are informed about the whole trade box and the utility (and the
monetary payoff) of player a and b induced by each allocation x. Analogously, in treatment P
subjects know the feasible payoff space U below the utility frontier (in Figure 3). The proposals
of both players in each round are made simultaneously with no more than five rounds to reach
an agreement. Each round lasted 1 minute at most. If at least one player did not deliver her
proposal in time, this period was counted as “time out”. After reaching an agreement or after
five rounds of proposals participants were rematched.
In the B-treatment a proposal xˆ of player a implies a commodity bundle for both players.
Let us denote the other’s proposal by y. Whenever the two proposals are mutually feasible in
the B-treatment, i.e. when the sum of the chosen consumption vectors does not exceed total
resources, i.e. if
x+ y ≤ (E1, E2),
an agreement is reached and both players get the payoff they proposed for themselves, that is,
either ua(x) and player b earns ub(y), resp. ua(y) and ub(x). If the proposed commodity vectors
x and y exceed total resources no agreement is reached yielding a new round of proposals
(except for round 5) when this implies conflict with ua(ea) = 0 and ub(eb) = 0.
In the P -treatment we denote a payoff proposal by u and the other’s payoff proposal by v.
Since participants know the feasible utility both proposals are feasible by restriction. Agreement
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is reached if (u, v) is a feasible payoff vector, i.e. if (u, v) is contained in the utility space (Figure
3), as confined by the ua-, the ub-axes and the Pareto or utility frontier U+b (·). In case of an
agreement, both parties obtain the utility (payoff) which they claimed for themselves in that
round, i.e. u, resp. v, otherwise the payoffs are 0.
As the game has a large multiplicity of strict equilibria, an unambiguous benchmark solution
has to rely on equilibrium selection. The Nash (1950 and 1953)-bargaining solution maximizing
the dividend product uaub over the feasible payoff set, illustrated by the graph in Figure 3, will
serve as a standard of comparison for both treatments (the reference point N in Figure 2 and
3).
The instructions for both treatments (Appendix) introduce the background of an exchange
economy and are formulated as similarly as possible. When clicking on a point in the trade box
the utility of player a and b for this allocation proposal appears on the screen. Analogously,
through a mouse click on points in the feasible utility space U the payoffs (u, uˆ) are shown
on the screen. Subjects can click on an arbitrary point in the trade box (treatment B) resp.
in the feasible utility space (treatment P ) on the screen. For the participants both sets seem
to be “continuous” although the computer “approximates” by a small grid. As can be seen
from the instructions (Appendix) the participants can also explore possible agreements without
having to compute their monetary implications (B-treatment) themselves. The software has
been designed in such a way that all attempts as well as their order are recorded which might
indicate how participants reason what to choose. The conversion rate between the Euro and
experimental currency units was EUR 0.75 for 1 experimental payoff unit.
Previous bargaining experiments often imposed symmetry. Their results could be ques-
tionable since subjects in symmetric designs tend to play fair.6 In our design we therefore
incorporated asymmetry by
α = 1/3, and β = 2/3, and (E1, E2) = (8, 3), ea = (E1, 0), eb = (0, E2).
This completes the description of our design by which we test the main hypothesis that
presenting an allocation problem in payoff or in commodity space (trade box) induces significant
efficiency and fairness effects.
4 Experimental results
An experimental session lasted no more than 50 minutes. The payoffs turned out to be different
for a- and b-participants and for participants in treatment B and treatment P and are reported
in table 1. It is notable that
treatment mean ua mean ub max ua max ub min ua min ub
B 1.96 2.08 2.73 3.27 0.5 0.61
P 2.43 2.49 3.72 4.62 1.82 1.77
Table 1: Overview of realized payoffs
• the subjects in treatment P earn more than in treatment B, regardless of their role and
for all measures (mean, max, min) in Table 1, and
6One possible way of reasoning implying this would be as follows:“Since we are both equal, we will in all
likelihood get the same. But then we should choose the best symmetric allocation!”
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• (except for min{u} in treatment P) b-participants fare better.
Did the subjects always reach an agreement? Did they always submit their proposals in
time? Tables 2 and 3 show how many agreements resp. disagreements or timeouts were observed.
Results for all 10 matching groups are shown for both treatments separately. Note that in each
period each matching group (with 4 pairs of bargaining partners) produced 4 final decisions
after no more than 5 rounds which implies 40 decisions within 10 periods.
groups # observations timeout no agreement agreement
B1 40 1 3 36
B2 40 1 5 34
B3 40 0 8 32
B4 40 0 5 35
B5 40 0 10 30
B6 40 0 3 37
B7 40 0 10 30
B8 40 0 3 37
B9 40 0 4 36
B10 40 0 2 38
mean 0.2 5.3 34.5
Table 2: Bargaining agreements (treatment B)
groups # observations timeout no agreement agreement
P1 40 0 5 35
P2 40 0 3 37
P3 40 0 3 37
P4 40 0 2 38
P5 40 0 8 32
P6 40 0 3 37
P7 40 0 6 34
P8 40 0 2 38
P9 40 1 7 32
P10 40 0 3 37
mean 0.1 4.2 35.7
Table 3: Bargaining agreements (treatment P)
According to Tables 2 and 3 there are only very few cases of not reaching a decision in time
(“timeout”). Also, disagreement cases did not occur very often. There is no big difference be-
tween treatments. Indeed, about 87% of all bargaining pairs reached an agreement irrespective
of the treatment.
4.1 Focal points
In this section we analyze whether the subjects in our experiments have aimed at some selective
outcome (like an equal commodity split, an equal payoff split, or the Nash-bargaining solution)
and whether framing has an effect on which benchmark is more decisive.
6
a) According to our main hypothesis of frame dependency fair divisions play a major role,
e.g. in treatment B equal sharing of commodities, that is, both demand the commodity
vector (4, 1.5). Tables 4 and 5 show the number of the nearly equal-split proposals realized 7
(out of 40 per group) in case of treatment B, separately for both types of players and for both
commodities. Nearly equal splits can differ by no more than 0.1 from the respective component
proposal a-player, equal split of
groups commodity 1 commodity 2 both commodities
xa = (4, 1.5)
B1 19 2 1
B2 10 1 0
B3 12 5 0
B4 19 2 1
B5 16 1 0
B6 32 4 4
B7 9 1 0
B8 16 13 8
B9 1 5 1
B10 18 8 1
mean 15.2 4.2 1.6
Table 4: Number of equal commodity-split proposals of player a
proposal b-player, equal split of
groups commodity 1 commodity 2 both commodities
xb = (4, 1.5)
B1 26 0 0
B2 17 0 0
B3 20 1 0
B4 13 0 0
B5 19 0 0
B6 27 0 0
B7 18 0 0
B8 21 3 2
B9 11 0 0
B10 20 0 0
mean 19.2 0.4 0.2
Table 5: Number of equal commodity-split proposals of player b
of the equal split (4, 1.5). From the experimental results in Tables 4 and 5 we conclude that
• there is a remarkable asymmetry in dividing commodity 1 and 2. There are more equal-
split proposals of commodity 1 than of commodity 2 regardless of who makes the proposal.
We see almost no (exact) equal-split proposal for both commodities.
7We only count realized proposals. Note that if one trader realizes an equal split, the other ,due to a more
moderate own demand, may not.
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• In most groups the number of equal-split proposals in at least one commodity does not
exceed 50%. Equal split in commodity space does not seem to be focal in commodity
division (treatment B).
b) Whereas in the B-treatment the participants can generate proposals based on commodity
quantities or the payoffs, in treatment P the subjects can focus only on payoffs. The payoff
division, generated by equal commodities and denoted by8 ues = (ua, ub) = (2.1, 2.9) should
therefore be more frequent in the B- rather than in the P-treatment. Again, we allow for some
proposal treatment B
groups ua ub ues = (2.1, 2.9)
B1 1 1 0
B2 8 2 1
B3 6 3 2
B4 6 0 0
B5 2 0 0
B6 6 1 1
B7 3 1 0
B8 14 2 0
B9 9 9 4
B10 10 0 0
mean 6.5 1.9 0.8
Table 6: Number of commodity-split proposals leading to ues = (2.1, 2.9) (treatment B)
proposal treatment P, reference point ues
groups ua ub ues = (2.1, 2.9)
P1 0 8 0
P2 1 0 0
P3 0 0 0
P4 0 0 0
P5 3 0 0
P6 3 1 1
P7 1 2 0
P8 12 4 3
P9 5 8 1
P10 1 1 0
mean 2.6 2.4 0.5
Table 7: Number of payoff proposals relying on ues = (2.1, 2.9) (treatment P)
noise in aiming at (2.1, 2.9).We count proposals as aiming at the target when ua is contained in
the interval (2.1− 0.1, 2.1+ 0.1) and ub in (2.9− 0.1, 2.9+ 0.1). Of the 40 decisions (per group)
only very few proposals aim at equal payoffs regardless of the treatment (see tables 6 and 7).
In treatment B, 21% of the decisions rely on ues, while in treatment P, this happens only in
8Note that ua(4, 1.5) = 2.08008 and ub(4, 1.5) = 2.8845. Because of grid approximation we have to round up
to (2.1, 2.9).
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12.5% of all decisions. Thus, in the box treatment the tendency to propose payoff distributions,
induced by equal split of commodities, is stronger.
c) One central question is, which treatment inspires more attempts to divide payoffs equally.
The equal and efficient payoff split is determined by the intersection point ueps := (2.54, 2.54)
of the 45 line and the Pareto frontier in the ua/ub space. Its experimental success is reported
in Tables 8 and 9.
proposal treatment B, equal payoff split of
groups ua ub ueps = (2.54, 2.54)
B1 16 25 14
B2 10 16 8
B3 10 19 7
B4 16 10 3
B5 17 16 9
B6 24 27 20
B7 9 21 8
B8 7 19 5
B9 0 14 0
B10 13 22 8
mean 12.2 18.9 8.2
Table 8: Number of equal payoff proposals (treatment B)
proposal treatment P, equal payoff split of
groups ua ub ueps = (2.54, 2.54)
P1 10 9 8
P2 28 17 14
P3 22 30 19
P4 14 32 11
P5 21 16 10
P6 27 18 12
P7 25 16 15
P8 20 14 8
P9 7 14 7
P10 17 12 10
mean 19.1 17.8 11.4
Table 9: Number of equal payoff-split proposals (treatment P)
As before, we count proposals ua resp. ub “near” the equal payoff split, i.e. contained in
the interval (2.54 − 0.1, 2.54 + 0.1) around (2.54, 2.54) as equal. Comparing Tables 8 and 9
with Tables 6 and 7 shows that efficient and equal payoff splits seem to be more attractive
than equal commodity sharing. More importantly, in treatment P we find more equal payoff
proposals than in treatment B which supports our conjecture that the framing matters.
d) The Nash-bargaining solution yields the payoff vector uNash = (2.2, 3.1). From Tables
10 and 11 we conclude that it was proposed only in very few cases. Neither in treatment B
nor in treatment P the exact Nash solution was proposed. If we count proposals ua resp. ub
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proposal treatment B, Nash payoff
groups ua ub uNash = (2.2, 3.1)
B1 11 0 0
B2 5 0 0
B3 2 0 0
B4 2 0 0
B5 9 0 0
B6 3 0 0
B7 13 0 0
B8 6 0 0
B9 16 0 0
B10 4 0 0
mean 7.1 0 0
Table 10: Number of Nash proposals (treatment B)
proposal treatment P, Nash payoff
groups ua ub uNash = (2.2, 3.1)
P1 14 0 0
P2 0 0 0
P3 4 0 0
P4 2 0 0
P5 6 0 0
P6 0 0 0
P7 5 0 0
P8 0 1 0
P9 14 0 0
P10 1 0 0
mean 4.6 0.1 0
Table 11: Number of Nash proposals (treatment P)
as Nash proposals if they are contained in the interval (2.15, 2.30) resp. (3.0, 3.2), according to
Tables 10 and 11 both treatments have inspired more such ua proposals than ub proposals.
4.2 Test results
Let us now test the hypothesis that “framing matters” through appropriate statistical tests.
a) We, first, compare some selected overall features in both treatments, namely
(1) the number of “timeout” cases
(2) the number of disagreement cases
(3) the number of agreement cases
(4) the frequency of proposals based on equal splits of commodities
(5) the frequency of proposals based on equal split and efficient payoffs
10
(6) the frequency of inefficient proposals ua = ub
(7) the frequency of inefficient proposals ua < ub
(8) the frequency of inefficient proposals ua > ub.
treatment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
trade box (B) 2 53 345 8 82 10 176 69
payoff space (P) 1 42 357 5 114 46 128 64
Table 12: Difference between treatment B and P (selected aggregate data)
The χ2 test results show that “overall behavior”, as captured by these criteria and reported
in Table 12, in treatment B and P is significantly different.9
b) We split the “overall” performance tests into three parts to better understand what accounts
for the framing effect. First, we consider the proposals for an equal split of both commodities
where we, of course, take payoff proposals in line with such equal commodity splits. The χ2-test
equal split of row
treatments commodity 1 commodity 2 both commodities total
trade box 65 19 8 92
payoff space 26 24 5 55
column total 91 43 13 147
Table 13: Equal commodity splits
reveals a significant difference of equal commodity split proposals which are more frequent in
treatment B than in treatment P.10
Second, we compare the frequency of equal payoff splits in both treatments, where we do
not differentiate between payoff splits of Pareto efficient and inefficient allocations. In Table 14
all payoff proposals are counted. The χ2-test shows a significant difference between treatment
payoff proposals row
treatments equal payoff unequal payoff total
trade box 92 245 337
payoff space 160 192 352
column total 252 437 689
Table 14: Equal payoff splits
B and treatment P.11 When the action space is the payoff space as in treatment P we observe
many more equal payoff-split proposals than in trade-box treatment B.
Third, we analyze whether framing has an impact on the efficiency of the proposals. In
Table 15 all proposals are classified regardless of their efficiency. Again the χ2-test reveals a
9χ2 = 38.545, p = 0.001.
10χ2-variable: 9.262, p− value = 0.0097.
11χ2-variable: 24.462, p− value = 0.0000008.
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payoff proposals row
treatments Pareto efficient not Pareto efficient total
trade box 82 255 337
payoff space 114 238 352
column total 196 493 689
Table 15: Equal payoff splits
significant difference between treatments.12 In the payoff space treatment P we observe more
efficient division proposals than in treatment B.
c) To compare the payoff proposals by type a- and b-participants, we employ the Mann-Whitney
U test to the data in Table 16. Columns 2 and 3 (resp. 5 and 6) in Table 16 are group means
proposal treatment B proposal treatment P
groups ua ub groups ua ub
B1 2.32 2.44 P1 2.34 2.62
B2 2.19 2.45 P2 2.47 2.55
B3 2.21 2.50 P3 2.52 2.41
B4 2.34 2.13 P4 2.52 2.53
B5 2.35 2.44 P5 2.42 2.51
B6 2.41 2.47 P6 2.39 2.49
B7 2.27 2.52 P7 2.46 2.53
B8 2.13 2.45 P8 2.29 2.38
B9 2.13 2.52 P9 2.26 2.59
B10 2.28 2.27 P10 2.54 2.31
mean 2.26 2.42 2.42 2.49
variance 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
median 2.28 2.45 2.44 2.52
Table 16: Payoff proposals in treatments B and P
(over all proposals of group members over 10 periods). The Mann-Whitney U test yields the
following answers on how role asymmetry and frame, resp. treatment are interrelated:
1. Is there a difference in the payoff proposals by type a and type b in treatments B and P?
• ua is significantly smaller (at the 5% level) in treatment B than in treatment P.13
• ub-proposals do not differ significantly in treatments B and P.14
2. Is there a difference between ua- and ub-proposals in treatment B, resp. treatment P ?
• In treatment B there is a significant difference between ua- and ub-proposals15. The
latter are more demanding.
• In treatment P the ua- and ub-proposals do not differ significantly.16
12χ2-variable: 5.487, p− value = 0.019.
13Mann Whitney U statistic: 13.50, p− value = 0.006.
14Mann Whitney U statistic: 29.00, p− value = 0.112.
15Mann Whitney U statistic: 14.50, p− value = 0.007.
16Mann Whitney U statistic: 29.00, p− value = 0.112.
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5 Concluding remarks
Demand effects of experimental designs are unavoidable. What has worried us, however, is
that robust findings of payoff distribution experiments have been unquestionably translated to
economic or social decision environments where the behavior is not to choose payoffs but rather
some market or other type of social activity of which the payoff implications are derivable but
not at all obvious. Our framing hypothesis does not claim that there is no efficiency or equity
when action space and payoff space differ but only that the tendency to strive for efficiency
and equity is significantly weaker. Our data confirms our intuition, i.e. we consciously or
unconsciously improve efficiency and fairness when we let the participants decide on payoffs
directly rather than on behavior like market decision making which implies such payoffs.
The situation for which we have analyzed the framing hypothesis has been a simple exchange
economy with two commodities and two trading agents. Regardless of whether bargaining
relied on trade or payoff proposals (treatment B, resp. P) we always allowed for five rounds
of simultaneous proposals at most in order to allow for coordination among negotiators. Our
treatment B can be viewed as an attempt to study the evolution of trade experimentally without
imposing market institutions like price vectors applying to all traders (see also Osborne and
Rubinstein, 1990, who explain trade by bilateral trade arrangements as in treatment B). In this
sense, our study may deserve some interest of its own, despite our main interest in testing the
framing hypothesis.
Compared to this, the P-treatment is a typical payoff distribution experiment, albeit one
relying on non-transferable utilities (see Mayberry, Nash, and Shubik, 1953, for an early study
of a so-called NTU-bargaining game) and the asymmetry of the bargaining parties. The two
latter aspects suggest a worst-case scenario for testing the basic framing hypothesis, since both,
non-transferable utilities as well as the structural asymmetry of the player roles, in all likelihood
discourage efficiency and fairness concerns. For the B-treatment the effect of utility transfers
and the symmetry of the feasible set in payoff space would have been less obvious. Here, those
aspects would have to be derived by the participants themselves which questions their relevance.
It was, therefore, important to confront the participants with a more complex bargaining game
avoiding the constant pie assumption and symmetry of the player roles.
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Appendix
A Translation of the instructions for the experiment
To simplify the exposition we present the instructions only for a-players. It is easy to see how
these must be adapted for b-players.
A.1 Treatment trade box
Experimental instructions
You are participating in an economic experiment. The participants take their decisions inde-
pendently of each other while sitting at a computer terminal. Any other form of communication
between the participants is not allowed.
This experiment lasts 10 periods. Each period consists of a maximum of 5 rounds. There
are 2 types of players, players of type A and players of type B. The roles of the players are
assigned to the participants randomly and are are not changed during the experiment. In this
room, there are only players of type A, in a second room there are only players of type B. One
player of type A and one player of type B are randomly rematched at the beginning of each
period in order to form a new group of two. Therefore, a pair of players is not changed during
the current period. Afterwards, each player is matched with another player just by chance.
You will not know who your partner is. Even after the experiment is finished you will not know
any of your previous partners.
In each period you and your partner can dispose of 8 commodity units (CUs) of com-
modity X and 3 commodity units of commodity Y. The amounts of the commodities X
and Y are denoted by x resp. y. You and your partner can agree on a particular allocation of
these commodity amounts. The amounts of both commodities which are allocated to player A
are denoted by xA resp. yA. The commodity amounts allocated to player B are denoted by xB
resp. yB .
Player A evaluates the commodity amounts allocated to him in monetary units (MUs) according
to the function a(xA, yA). Function b(xB , yB) is the evaluation function of player B.
Both evaluation functions are explicitly given by:
a(xA, yA) = x
1/3
A · y2/3A and b(xB , yB) = x2/3B y1/3B
You can divide 8 CUs of commodity X and 3 CUs of commodity Y. Look at the following image
which will appear on your screen:
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Your CUs of X . . . . . . CUs of X for your partner . . . . . .
Your CUs of Y . . . . . . CUs of Y for your partner . . . . . .
Your MUs . . . . . . MUs of your partner . . . . . .
The box above contains all possible allocations of both commodities between player A and B.
Example:
Suppose both players would agree on allocation P; then A would possess 8 CUs of X
and B would possess 3 CUs of Y.
In Q, player A would possess 1 CU of X and 1 CU of Y, while B possesses 7 CUs
of X and 2 CUs of Y.
Both players make an allocation proposal simultaneously, i.e. they enter their proposal into
the computer without knowing the partner’s proposal. You propose an allocation by moving
the mouse pointer over the above picture shown on the screen and clicking on the desired
commodity allocation with the left mouse button. The proposals are exact up to two decimals.
Below the figure on the screen each player is shown the CUs of X and Y and the respective
monetary values induced by his/her allocation proposal. Furthermore, you see the CUs on the
screen and their monetary value resulting from your proposal to player B. You can alter your
proposal at any time. However, once you have made your final decision on your proposal and
sent it to the server by clicking on the OK-button, it cannot be changed anymore.
By clicking on the F1-button you can obtain information about previous periods at any time.
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In short, the experiment works as follows:
You have one period to come to an agreement on the allocation of the total amounts of the
commodities X and Y. A period consists of a maximum of 5 rounds . In each round you
and your partner can submit an allocation proposal. The duration of a round is limited to one
minute, i.e. you can submit your proposal within one minute.
If both players agree on their allocation proposals within one minute each player is notified
to collect the payoffs induced by the allocation and the next period starts. Agreement occurs
when the simultaneous commodity-allocation proposals are feasible. Two allocation proposals
are regarded to be feasible when:
First, the sum of CUs of X which both players proposed for themselves is less or
equal to 8.
And second, the sum of CUs of Y which both players proposed for themselves is less
or equal to 3.
In this case both players get the amount of each commodity they have proposed for
themselves. The players are credited these amounts in MUs. If the players’ proposals imply
that not all resources of commodity X or Y are consumed completely the remainder is wasted.
If a round has to be closed (after one minute) without having reached an agreement (i.e. the
proposed allocations are not feasible or both proposals do not arrive in time) the next round
starts. If there is no agreement within 5 rounds each player obtains zero MUs as period payoff
of the current period and the next period starts.
A period lasts no more than five rounds and it ends either by reaching an agreement within
five rounds or by reaching no agreement resp. by not sending a proposal at all. Once a round
is finished a player is informed only whether an agreement has been reached or not. That is,
each player only knows her own proposal and does not know the partner’s proposal in
any case. After the experiment is finished each player gets the sum of all period payoffs in
cash. The conversion rate of MUs to the Euro is equal to 0,75.
Example:
Player A proposes 7 CUs of X and and 2.9 CUs of Y for herself. Player B proposes
6.7 CUs of X and 2 CUs of Y for herself. These allocation proposals are not feasible
since player A and player B together want to get 13.7 CUs of X and 4.9 CUs of Y,
while there are only 8 and 3 CUs of both commodities available.
Now suppose that player A proposes 2 CUs of X and 0,5 CUs of Y for herself.
Player B proposes 1 CU of X and 1 CU of Y for herself. These proposals are in fact
feasible since the total commodity demand is equal to 3 CUs of X and 1.5 CUs of
Y. Therefore, both players get what they proposed for themselves. 5 CUs of X and
1.5 CUs of Y are wasted. The period is finished.
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A.2 Treatment payoff space
Experimental instructions
You are participating in an economic experiment. The participants make their decisions inde-
pendently of each other while sitting at a computer terminal. Oral communication between the
participants is not allowed.
This experiment lasts 10 periods. Each period consists of a maximum of 5 rounds. There are 2
types of players, players of type A and players of type B. The roles of the players are assigned
to the participants randomly and are not changed during the experiment. In this room there
are only players of type A, in a second room there are only players of type B. One player of
type A and one player of type B are randomly rematched at the beginning of each period
in order to form a new group of two players. Therefore, a pair of bargaining partners is not
changed during the current period. Afterwards, each player is matched with another player
just by chance. You will not know who your partner is. Even after the experiment is finished
you will not know any of your previous partners.
In each period there is the same number of monetary units (MUs) available to a group
of two players. You can come to an agreement on how to divide this sum. In order to do this
look at the following drawing which will appear on your screen (The MUs for A are depicted
on the x-axis, The MUs for B are depicted on the y-axis):
Your MUs: . . . . . . MUs of your partner: . . . . . .
The area below the curve and the curve itself represent all possible divisions of the total amount
given in MUs.
Example: In P player A gets 1 MU and player B gets 2 MUs.
Both players make their division proposal simultaneously, i.e. they type their proposal into the
computer without knowing the partner’s proposal. You propose a particular division allocation
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by moving the mouse pointer over the above picture shown on the screen and clicking on the
desired money-division proposal with the left mouse button. The proposals are exact up to
two decimals. Below the figure on the screen each player is shown the MUs of X and Y. You
can alter your proposal at any time. However, once you have made your final decision on your
proposal and sent it to the server by clicking on the OK-button, it cannot be changed anymore.
By clicking on the F1-button you can obtain information about previous periods at any time.
In short, the experiment works as follows:
You have one period to reach an agreement on the division of the total monetary amount. A
period consists of a maximum of 5 rounds. In each round you and your partner can submit
a division proposal. The duration of a round is limited to one minute, i.e. you can submit
your proposal within one minute.
If both players agree on their division proposals within one minute each player is credited the
respective amount of MUs and collects the payoffs according to the proposals and the next
period starts. Both players reach an agreement when both division proposals are feasible.
Two proposals are feasible when each player does not propose to get more money than her
partner would want to give to her. In this case both, players A and B are credited the amount
they require for themselves. If the players reach an agreement such as that the total sum of
MUs available is not exhausted the remaining money is wasted.
In case you did not reach an agreement (i.e. the proposed divisions are not feasible or 1 minute
elapsed without any party making a proposal) the next round starts. If you do not reach an
agreement even after 5 rounds have elapsed you will get 0 MUs in the current period and the
next period starts.
Therefore, a period consists of a maximum of 5 rounds. A period ends within 5 rounds either
by making a feasible division proposal or by reaching the time limit without making a proposal
or by not reaching an agreement. After a round is finished each player is informed whether
an agreement has been reached or not. Each player knows only her own proposal and is not
informed about her partner’s previous proposals. After 10 periods each player obtains
the sum of all her period payoffs in cash. The conversion rate is as follows: 1 MU is equivalent
to 0,75 Euro.
Example:
Player A proposes 3.5 MUs for herself and 0.5 MUs for player B. Player B proposes
4.8 MUs for herself and 0.5 MUs for player A. That is, player B wants to give 0.5
MUs to player A, while player A wants to have 3.5 MUs, therefore, these proposals
are not compatible. Furthermore, player B wants to have 4.8 MUs for herself, while
player A would only propose to give 0.5 MUs to her. If both players are in round 1
to 4 a new round starts otherwise a new period starts.
Now, suppose that player A proposes 0.8 MUs for herself and 4.3 MUs for player
B, while player B proposes 0.6 MUs for herself and 3.9 MUs for player A. Since
A proposes 4.3 MUs for B, however, B only requires 0.6 MUs and B proposes 3.9
MUs for A, while A proposes 0.8 MUs this division is feasible and each player gets
the amount she requires. That is, A gets 0.8 MUs, B gets 0.6 MUs. The remaining
amount of money is wasted and the period is finished. If both players are in a period
< 10, a new period starts. If you are already in period 10 the experiment is finished.
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